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ENVIRONMENTAL SELF-AUDIT PRIVILEGE:
THE STRAW THAT BREAKS THE BACK OF
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
Linda A. Spahr*
T he past three years have seen a precipitous surge of state
legislation creating a "limited" or "qualified" environmental
self-audit privilege.' These adjectives are misleading; the privilege
* Assistant District Attorney, Suffolk County District Attorney's Office, Chief
of District Attorney's Environmental Crime Unit.
1. As practiced in the business community, professional health and safety
audits fall into two basic categories, compliance audits and management systems
audits. A compliance audit is a comparison of business practices with regulatory
requirements, organizational policies and good management practices. The goal of
such an audit is to find and eliminate noncompliance. A management systems
audit is an evaluation of how environmental, health, and safety activities are
managed so as to promote compliance and limit liability exposures. The goal of a
management systems audit is to manage and reduce risk.
Industry interests gave rise to environmental audits in the mid-1970s, and
they are now widely used for economic and managerial reasons as much as for
regulatory compliance. Audits lead to economic improvement and competitive
advantages since they are an invaluable way to increase efficiency and productiv-
ity. Use of audits can detect sloppy practices, and can sometimes convert waste
into profit.
Companies that conduct audits significantly reduce their potential civil
liability when they discover and correct problems before they become serious.
Government contractors can avoid suspension and debarment by remaining aware
of their compliance status. Also, industry trade associations, such as the Chemical
Manufacturers Association, are essentially requiring environmental auditing pro-
grams as a condition of membership. See generally Jack Doyle, Audits Are Their
Own Reward, ENVTL. F. Jan./Feb. 1992; Robert W. Darnell, Environmental Crim-
inal Enforcement and Corporate Environmental Auditing: Time for a Compro-
mise?, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 123 (1993); Patrick J. Ennis, Environmental Au-
dits: Protective Shields or Smoking Guns? How to Encourage the Private Sector
to Perform Environmental Audits and Still Maintain Effective Enforcement, 42
WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 389, 408 (1992).
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is extensive in both scope and impact
Given the current climate of regulatory reform, it is no surprise
that well-intentioned legislatures so readily enact laws that offer the
attractive illusion of helping both industry and the environment.
Since privilege legislation has been so fervently lobbied by business
groups, and the laws are viewed as essentially benign, sponsorship
of privilege bills has become an expedient way to both appease
industry and drive home a message of discontent to the EPA and
state environmental regulatory agencies.
The "privilege movement" has succeeded without regard to
regulatory and prosecutorial concerns that the laws have been
neither adequately studied, nor their impact adequately assessed.'
The most recent study about audit practices in this country was commis-
sioned by private professional auditing associations to provide the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") with input as it reviewed its policies to encourage
voluntary compliance. In general, the larger the business in terms of the number
of employees, the number of facilities, and the amount of sales, the more likely it
is to conduct audits. The Voluntary Environmental Audit Survey of U.S. Business,
March 1995, Price Waterhouse LLP [hereinafter Price Waterhouse study].
See infra notes 2-5 and accompanying text for a general description of
privilege and immunity statutes and a list of state statutes.
2. These newly created privileges are much broader than any existing
privileges derived from common law or the Constitution in that existing privileg-
es apply only to communications. See infra note 62 and accompanying text. Envi-
ronmental audit privileges, however, apply to documents and activities. Existing
privileges do not prohibit the use in evidence of information derived from privi-
leged communications, while environmental audit privileges apply the "fruit of
the poisonous tree" doctrine and prohibit the use of evidence developed from
intentional or unintentional review of privileged documents. See infra note 63 and
accompanying text. Also, the burden of proof in asserting all existing privileges
is on the person claiming the privilege; the environmental audit privilege shifts
the burden of proof to the prosecutor who must prove that a privilege does not
apply, but who is prohibited from conducting an investigation on the matter prior
to a hearing. See infra part IV.B.2. For a complete discussion of privilege laws
and the constitutional impact of environmental audit privileges, see Position Pa-
per of the California District Attorneys Association, Environmental Protection
Committee on The Concept of Immunity for Self-Critical Analysis and the Federal
Statutory Environmental Audit Privilege, November 1994, [hereinafter CDAA
Position Paper] on file in EPA Air Docket C-94-0 1, Document IV-G- 11 (items
on file in the Air Docket will hereinafter be cited as "Air Docket" followed by
the document number. An index to all items on file, and copies of those items,
may be obtained by calling EPA at (202) 260-7548). See also, infra part IV.
3. See Air Docket Document IV-G-1 1 (CDAA Position Paper), supra note 2;
1996] ENVTL. SELF-AUDIT PRIVILEGE 637
Despite EPA's extensive review of its enforcement policy, and
subsequent enactment of broad regulatory reforms to encourage
both environmental self-auditing and voluntary compliance in
general,4 state privilege laws have been enacted with whirlwind
Ronald David, Case Against Environmental Audit Privilege, NAT'L ENVTL.
ENFORCEMENT J., Sept. 1994; Air Docket Document II-C-14 (comments of
Fourteen State Attorneys General); Air Docket Document IV-G-1 1 (comments of
National District Attorneys Association).
4. In May 1994, the Administrator of EPA asked the Office of Enforcement
and Compliance Assurance to assess whether further incentives were necessary in
order to encourage the voluntary disclosure and correction of violations uncov-
ered during environmental audits and self-evaluations. To that end, EPA held a
major two-day public meeting in Washington, D.C., in July 1994, and a closed
two-day information gathering session in October 1994 at which individuals were
invited to make presentations. EPA also held a focus group meeting in San Fran-
cisco on January 19, 1995 with key stakeholders from industry, trade groups,
state environmental commissions, state attorneys' general offices, district
attorneys' offices, environmental and public interest groups, and professional
environmental auditing groups. This was followed by a public comment session
in San Francisco on January 20, 1995 wherein EPA invited comment from the
public and conducted its own analysis of relevant facts.
On December 22, 1995, EPA issued its final policy to encourage regulated
entities to voluntarily discover, disclose, correct, and prevent violations of envi-
ronmental law. Where violations are discovered through voluntary environmental
audits or efforts that reflect the entity's due diligence, EPA will not seek gravity-
based penalties; and will generally not recommend criminal prosecution. Further,
EPA will reduce gravity-based penalties by 75% for violations that are voluntari-
ly discovered, and are promptly disclosed and corrected, even if not found
through an audit or due diligence. Finally, EPA restated its practice of refraining
from routine requests for environmental audit reports. See Incentive for Self-
Policing: Discovery, Disclosures, Corrections and Preventions of Violations, 60
Fed. Reg. 66,706 (1995) [hereinafter EPA policy].
In connection with its new policy, EPA reiterated its firm opposition to the
establishment of statutory environmental audit privileges, clearly stating its rea-
sons as: (1) the secrecy engendered by a privilege is contrary to legal precedent
and public policy as recognized by the Supreme Court; (2) during its eighteen
month study, no evidence was produced demonstrating the need for a privilege
because the practice of environmental auditing has expanded broadly; (3) a privi-
lege would invite defendants to claim as "audit" material almost any evidence
needed to establish violations or responsibility for conduct; (4) audit privilege
would breed litigation, with in camera proceedings resulting in time-consuming
mini-trials; (5) by reducing penalties and liabilities in the manner which the Price
Waterhouse study indicated would increase auditing programs, the EPA policy
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speed. As of March, 1996, seventeen states had passed such laws.5
Because these statutes were enacted with such haste, it was
almost inevitable that serious, albeit unintended, consequences
would be overlooked. The most significant consequence is that
privilege legislation, with its built in presumptions, notifications and
hearings, will dramatically interfere with the prosecution of crimes
that were never the subject of environmental audits. It will shield
those who intentionally dump toxic substances in our woods and
streams, and who defraud legitimate, law abiding businesses.
Part I of this Article will discuss the various elements of
environmental self-audit privilege statutes. Part II describes the
assertions of privilege proponents, and argues that their support for
privilege legislation is based on a lack of knowledge and
understanding of the types of environmental crimes which are
eliminates the need for privileges against government; and (6) audit privileges are
strongly opposed by the law enforcement community, including the National
Association of District Attorneys, as well as by public interest groups. 60 Fed.
Reg. 66,706, 66,710.
5. The state laws which have been enacted are: Arkansas, 1995 Ark. Acts 350
(codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 8-1-301 to 8-1-312 (Michie Supp. 1995));
Colorado, 1994 Colo. Legis. Serv. 304 (West) (codified at COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-25-126.5 (Supp. 1996)); Idaho, 1995 Idaho Sess. Laws 359 (codified at
IDAHO CODE §§ 9-801 to 9-811 (Supp. 1996)); Illinois, 1994 Ill. Legis. Serv.
P.A. 88-690 (West) (codified at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 415, para. 5/52.2 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1996)); Indiana, Ind. Acts P.L. 1-1996, § 18 (codified at IND. CODE
§§ 13-28-4-1 to 13-28-4-10 (Bums 1996)); Kansas, 1995 Kan. Sess. Laws 204
(codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-3332 to 60-3339 (Supp. 1995)); Kentucky,
1994 Ky. Acts 430 (codified at KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.01-040
(Michie/Bobbs-MerrilU Supp. 1994)); Michigan, 1996 Mich. Legis. Serv. P.A. 132
(West) (to be codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 324.14801 to 324.14810);
Minnesota, 1995 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 168 (West); Mississippi, 1995 Miss.
Laws 627 (codified at Miss. CODE ANN. § 49-2-71 (Supp. 1996)); New Hamp-
shire, 1996 N.H. Laws 4 (to be codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147-E);
Oregon, 1993 Or. Laws 422 (codified at OR. REV. STAT. § 468.963 (Supp.
1996)); South Dakota, 1996 S.D. Laws 18 (codified at S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. §§ 1-40-33 to 1-40-37 (1996)); Texas, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 219
(Vernon) (codified at TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc (West Supp.
1996)); Utah, 1995 Utah Laws 304 (codified at UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 19-7-101 to
19-7-109 (1995 & Supp. 1996)); Virginia, 1995 Va. Acts 564 (codified at VA.
CODE ANN. § 10.1-1198 to 10-1-1199 (Michie Supp. 1996)); Wyoming, 1995
Wyo. Sess. Laws 58, §1 (codified at WYO. STAT. § 35-11-1105 (Supp. 1996)).
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prosecuted. Part III of this Article describes the types of
environmental crimes which are in fact prosecuted. Part IV argues
that privilege statutes will affect the decision to prosecute, and will
hamper actual prosecution of environmental crimes. This Article
concludes that the unanticipated implications of privilege laws are
only beginning to be felt, and that any alleged benefit of such laws
will be greatly outweighed by their negative impacts on the
environment and on prosecution of environmental crimes.
I. GENERAL PROVISIONS OF PRIVILEGE AND IMMUNITY STATUTES
While the privilege and immunity laws are varied, they share
common features. Almost all of the laws provide that environmental
self-audit reports are privileged.6 Thus, they are not accessible to
third parties, including government, absent a waiver or court or-
der.7 About half also provide immunity from criminal, civil, and
administrative prosecution and penalties, or all three, if a self-dis-
covered violation is disclosed and corrected.' Others provide im-
munity for disclosed violations, but no actual privilege.9
6. The language in the Arkansas statute is typical: "An environmental audit
report shall be privileged and shall not be admissible as evidence in any civil,
criminal, or administrative legal action, including enforcement actions." ARK.
CODE ANN. § 8-1-303(b). For statutes with similar language, see OR. REv. STAT.
§ 468.963(2) and ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 415, para. 5/52.2(b). Some statutes specifi-
cally provide that audit reports are not subject to discovery procedures in admin-
istrative, civil, or criminal cases. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-2-71(1).
7. An express waiver is usually provided for in the statute. See, e.g., MISS.
CODE ANN. § 49-2-71(1)(a). Some statutes allow a party to waive the privilege to
selected portions of an audit report. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1-304(b). In
others, the right to assert the privilege is deemed waived where the owner or
operator fails to file a petition for an in camera hearing on the applicability of
the privilege within a specified time after the prosecution obtains a copy. The
audit report remains sealed and inaccessible to the prosecution during the waiting
period. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 13-28-4-5.
8. See, e.g., 1996 Mich. Legis. Serv. P.A. 132 (to be codified at MICH. COMP.
LAws ANN. § 324.14809(1)). A small minority of audit privilege laws do not
require correction of discovered violations to keep the audit report secret. For
example, the Virginia statute provides civil and administrative (but not criminal)
immunity for violations which are disclosed and corrected. However, it does not
require violations to be corrected for an audit report to remain privileged, unless
it demonstrates a "clear, imminent and substantial danger to the public health or
the environment. . . ." VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1198(B).
9. For example, under the South Dakota statute, if a company completes an
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The laws typically define an environmental audit as a systematic
review of a facility's practices to determine non-compliance with
certain environmental laws.' ° Most specify a variety of documents
which may be considered a part of such reports and to which the
privilege extends. These include field notes, records of observa-
tions, findings, opinions, suggestions, conclusions, drafts, memoran-
da, drawings, photographs, maps, charts, graphs, and surveys."
Most of the laws prohibit parties that participated in audits from
disclosing, testifying, or being compelled to testify about the audit
report or underlying facts. 2 Included with participants would be
those who were made privy to audits, those who did work, and
those who provided estimates for corrective work arising from the
audit. Some even provide civil or criminal penalties for disclosure
of privileged audit information. 3 Virtually all prohibit the use in
environmental audit "there shall be a presumption against the imposition of civil
or criminal penalties for violations found and disclosed." S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 1-40-33. The Minnesota law limits disclosure to third parties only if the
company corrects its violations. See 1995 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 168.
10. For example, the Idaho statute defines an environmental audit as "an
internal evaluation done pursuant to a plan or protocol that is designed to identify
and prevent noncompliance and to improve compliance with statutes, regulations,
permits, and orders." IDAHO CODE § 9-803(3). See also KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 224.01-040(1)(a) (similar language); WYO. STAT. § 35-11-1105(a)(i) (similar
language).
11. For example, the Wyoming statute defines an environmental audit report
as "a set of documents, each labeled 'Environmental Audit Report: Privileged
Document,' prepared as a result of an environmental audit and may include field
notes and records of observations, findings, opinions, suggestions, conclusions,
drafts, memoranda, drawings, photographs, computer-generated or electronically
recorded information, maps, charts, graphs and surveys if supporting information
is generated or developed for the primary purpose and in the course of an envi-
ronmental audit." Wyo. STAT. § 35-11-1105(a)(ii). See also IDAHO CODE § 9-
803(4) (similar language); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.01-040(l)(b) (similar lan-
guage).
12. The Illinois statute states: "an officer or employee involved with the
environmental audit, or any consultant who is hired for the purpose of performing
the environmental audit, may not be examined as to the environmental audit or
any environmental audit report .... " ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 415, para. 5/52.2(c).
13. According to the Mississippi statute: "If any party divulges all or any part
of the information contained in an environmental self-evaluation report in viola-
tion of ... this subsection ... such party ... is liable for any damages caused
by the divulgence . .. ." MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-2-71(3)(b). In Texas, a govern-
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evidence of any privileged documents or audit activities, or any
evidence derived therefrom if it was not obtained in accordance
with the procedures set forth in the applicable statute.'
4
The laws which establish a privilege generally require that a
prosecutor coming into possession of an audit report, or a document
labeled as such, seal it without reading it, and file it with a court
pending an in camera review or hearing to determine the applica-
bility of the privilege. 5 Yet, most statutes allow a prosecutor to
review the presumptively privileged documents prior to the in cam-
era review, provided the documents are only to be used to prepare
for the review or hearing itself.'6 None of the laws specify how
such a hearing is to be conducted, whether witnesses can be called
to testify, or what evidence would be admissible. If the documents
are determined to be privileged, none of the evidence developed to
prepare for the hearing may be used either for investigative purpos-
es or as evidence against a company.
Most laws specify the parties, or classes of parties, to whom an
audit document may be shown without causing a waiver of the
privilege. These may include lawyers, environmental consultants,
employees, potential purchasers, lenders, and contractors providing
estimates for services in connection with corrective efforts resulting
from an audit. 7
ment official may be guilty of a misdemeanor for disclosing information in viola-
tion of the privilege law even if the document is not labeled privileged, though
lack of labeling may be raised as an affirmative defense. TEx. REv. Crv. STAT.
ANN. art. 4447cc § (6)(d). Utah law imposes both civil and criminal liability for
unlawful disclosure of privileged information. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 19-7-
104(2), 19-7-104(3). For similar language, see also COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-25-
126.5(5)(b)(I), (b)(II).
14. In Texas, a party that allegedly fails to comply with this requirement "has
the burden of proving.., that the evidence.., was not derived from the unau-
thorized review ... " of privileged materials. TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
4447cc § (9)(h). See also UTAH CODE ANN. § 19-7-106(4) (similar language).
15. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 8-1-309(a)(1)(3), (b)(1); KY. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 224.01-040(5)(a); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3335(a)-(b).
16. In Texas, "Information used in preparation for the in camera review ...
(1) is confidential. . . [and] ... (2) may not be used in any investigation or legal
proceeding .... TEX. REv. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc § (9)(f). See also IND.
CODE § 13-28-4-5(d), 5(e).
17. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 415, para. 5/52.2(i). In Texas, disclosure of an
1996]
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Most of the laws provide exceptions which will void a claim of
privilege and make documents available to litigants, including pros-
ecutors. Those exceptions are the basis for describing the privileges
as "limited" or "qualified." However, none of the states allow the
presumptively privileged documents to be used for any investigative
purposes until after the court determines that an exception applies.
The more common exceptions to the statutory privilege are invoked
when:
a) the privilege is asserted for a fraudulent purpose. (The term is
never defined.)."8
b) the material is not subject to the privilege (doesn't satisfy statu-
tory definition). 19
c) the material shows evidence of non-compliance with designated
environmental laws and efforts were not made to correct the prob-
lems. Some statutes say corrective action must be taken "prompt-
ly" or "with reasonable diligence."' None, however, set forth the
means by which a court is to make those factual determinations, or
provide for review of the determination if new evidence is discov-
ered.
d) a few statutes provide exceptions to the privilege if the audit
report shows evidence of an imminent threat to public health or
safety.2 But that determination, again addressed in an apparent
audit report to employees for the purpose of correcting violations does not waive
the privilege. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc § (6)(b)(1). Nor is it
waived if an audit report is disclosed under a confidentiality agreement to a
potential partner, transferee, lender, or insurer. Id. § (6)(b)(2).
18. IND. CODE § 13-28-4-3(a)(2)(A); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 224.01-
040(4)(d)(1).
19. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.01-040(4)(d)(2).
20. In Mississippi, the privilege does not apply if the party "did not initiate
appropriate efforts to achieve compliance ... promptly ... and, as a result ...
did not or will not achieve compliance ... within a reasonable amount of time."
MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-2-71(1)(b)(ii). See also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 415, para.
5/52.2(d)(2)(c) ("reasonable time"), and IND. CODE § 13-28-4-3(a)(2)(c)(iii) ("rea-
sonable diligence").
21. In Mississippi, the in camera review must convince the hearing officer
that "a condition exists that demonstrates an imminent and substantial hazard or
endangerment to the public health and safety or the environment" to overcome
the privilege. Miss. CODE ANN. § 49-2-71(1)(d). However, the in camera pro-
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evidentiary void, is not made until the in camera hearing is held
on the admissibility of unread and sealed documents.
e) some laws provide exceptions to the privilege if documents
show evidence of certain violations, and proof of those violations
is not otherwise available to the prosecution." How the assertion
can be made by a prosecutor who has no access to the documents
in the first place is not explained.
II. THE ILLUSION THAT PRIVILEGE AND IMMUNITY STATUTES
ARE BENIGN
Among privilege proponents, there is a universal belief that
privilege and immunity laws will have little or no effect on the
appropriate enforcement of environmental law. Proponents of
privilege laws have garnered support for such laws by advancing
the notion that privileges are limited and will always allow for
prosecution of the "truly" bad actors.
While introducing a bill proposing the federal Environmental
Audit Protection Act, legislation modeled after the first state
privilege law passed in his home state of Oregon,' Senator
Mark Hatfield described it as creating a "very limited legal privi-
lege." 4 The Senator also asserted that his "bill would not bar
any enforcement action for any environmental violation .... No
environmental law is decriminalized, and the enforcement agen-
cies are not barred from pursuing action. '
Endorsing the Hatfield bill for its progressiveness, many mem-
bers of industry and the legal community in Oregon seemed sur-
prised that it would face opposition. One law firm that consulted
with Senator Hatfield on developing his bill commented:
The objections of the Environmental Protection Agency and the
United States Department of Justice to the environmental audit
privilege are very difficult to understand, especially if the privilege
ceeding cannot be brought on without probable cause, from an independent
source, that the condition exists.
22. See, e.g., IND. CODE 13-28-4-3(a)(2)(D); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 224.01-
040(4)(d)(4); OR. REv. STAT. § 468.963(3)(c)(D).
23. See OR. REv. STAT. § 468.963.
24. 140 CONG. REc. S10,942 (daily ed. Aug. 8, 1994).
25. Id.
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is limited in the manner provided in the Oregon law. We are hard
pressed to think of any circumstances under which the audit privi-
lege would frustrate civil or criminal investigations or enforce-
ment.
26
The confusion is understandable. The Oregon privilege law was
part of a crime bill which for the first time enacted felony provi-
sions in that state's environmental statutes. As part of a compro-
mise bill, the privilege law was a trade-off for passage of stiffer
criminal penalties. Though state prosecutors only supported the
bill in "lukewarm fashion," 7 it has been suggested that passage
was driven by a misapprehension that it was necessary to seek
felony sanctions to comply with the state's authorization."
The attorney who represented the Oregon District Attorneys
Association in the committee that negotiated the bill explained
the efforts made to avoid abuse of the privilege:
When the privilege was first proposed by the Associated Oregon
Industries, it was a broad privilege .... [Proponents] acknowl-
edged that changes had to be made to ensure that there were not
abuses .... The committee spent the next several months trying
to fix the privilege to avoid problems .... As we continued the
process, we reviewed cases and tried to create hypothetical situa-
tions that might arise .... The only scenarios we could envision
where the privilege applied were situations that did not justify
prosecution. I know there are people within the EPA who have a
real fear of the audit privilege. I have talked to these people and
asked them to give me circumstances where the privilege would
result in loss of evidence to the state in cases that we would want
to prosecute. They were unable to do so .... [One downside to
the law is that] it will create an extra hoop ... to jump through to
get evidence of guilt. There may be other downsides that we did
not envision. I am sure we did not draft the perfect law and some-
day we could see a side of this law that we did not anticipate. If
26. Id. at 10,947 (letter from J. Mark Morford, Stoel Rives Boley Jones &
Grey, to Sen. Mark Hatfield).
27. Air Docket Document VIII-13, at 84 (remarks of Craig Johnston, Lewis
and Clark University Law School, at USEPA Environmental Auditing Open Mike
Session in San Francisco, CA, Jan. 20, 1995 [hereinafter January 20, 1995 EPA
meeting]) (transcript of proceedings).
28. Id. (remarks of Gil Jensen, Alameda County, CA District Attorney's
Office).
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that happens, I will be the first to say I made a mistake.29
This career prosecutor's instincts about unforeseen consequences
of the law were correct.
It is understandable that those outside the criminal justice sys-
tem, particularly those who make a living trying to bring compa-
nies into compliance with complex environmental regulations,
would assess the impact of privilege and immunity laws in the
limited context of potential prosecutions for violations which they
themselves discover. Because those in the private sector do not
know what types of crimes are generally prosecuted, nor how
those crimes are investigated, it follows that they would "not
believe that privilege would be a significant impairment of the
government's enforcement program . ...""
The author of Colorado's privilege and immunity statute,3' the
second such law enacted in the country, is also adamant that the
law does not affect government's ability to enforce environmental
laws.32 This is so despite the bill author's candid admission to
EPA that at least one problematic scenario - one in which the
statute would preclude use of an audit which should be available
to prosecutors - had not been envisioned in the bill's drafting.33
While environmental prosecutors generally agree that there is a
need for regulatory reform, and a need to create programs to
induce voluntary compliance with environmental laws, they vehe-
mently oppose privilege legislation.34 Neither EPA nor prosecu-
torial agencies routinely request audit reports; an audit report has
29. Air Docket Document II-F-09 (letter from John C. Bradley, First Assistant
District Attorney, Multnomah County, Oregon, to James M. Whitty, Legislative
Counsel, Associated Oregon Industries (July 25, 1994)).
30. Air Docket Document VIII-13, at 15 (remarks of Scott Leheka, Atlantic
Richfield Company, at January 20, 1995 EPA meeting).
31. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-25-126.5.
32. Air Docket Document VIII-1 1 at 5 (remarks of Cindy Goldman, Colorado
Association of Commerce and Industry, at October 6, 1994 EPA Environmental
Auditing Policy Workgroup Meeting).
33. Id. at 6 (the scenario posed to Cindy Goldman was one in which a com-
pany conducts an audit that reveals no violations of law, but identifies problems
that could impact future operations. The problems are not corrected because the
company has no money to correct them, but three years later a major violation
occurs).
34. Supra note 3.
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never been used to criminally prosecute a company for violations
it discovered as a result of an environmental self-audit. 5 Ac-
cordingly, statutes prohibiting government from seeking such
reports are simply unnecessary.
Even privilege proponents agree that EPA has adhered to its
policy of not routinely requesting audit documents. In supporting
the introduction of the Hatfield bill, one major corporation wrote:
In 1986, a year before [we] began environmental auditing,....
[EPA] published the Environmental Auditing Policy State-
ment .... EPA stated that it would not routinely request audit
documents .... The policy gave some of industry a limited
amount of comfort it sought to be able to initiate internal environ-
mental auditing programs. In the years since the Policy was pub-
lished, EPA has demonstrated its integrity by adhering to the poli-
cy .... Since 1986, [EPA] has been very conscientious about
adhering to the Policy. But it doesn't have to. That is what con-
tinues to worry many in industry.36
It is clear that the entire audit "problem," as it applies to the
use of audit documents by government agencies, is simply a
perception. While acknowledging that there is no history of such
abuse, privilege proponents repeatedly cite a fear that government
will misuse audits in the future.
That illusory fear would never have provided the impetus for
intense lobbying which has driven the privilege movement. The
real driving fear, it seems, is not government abuse, but private
party abuse were audit are documents readily available. This
more realistic industry concern has been downplayed in the na-
tional debate, but is alluded to repeatedly: "[gliven the sensitivity
of environmental issues, there is a sincere concern that such doc-
uments could be used abusively by private litigants unless pro-
tected. 37
The Compliance Management and Policy Group ("CMPG"), an
industry coalition that actively lobbies for privilege legislation,
has lobbied even harder for the type of compliance policies which
35. Supra note 4; see also David, supra note 3, at 4.
36. 140 CONG. REC. S10,942, S10,947 (letter from David Wilson, Senior
Environmental Engineer, PacifiCorp, to Sen. Mark Hatfield).
37. Id. at S10,946 (letter from Bert P. Krages, II, Louisiana-Pacific Corpora-
tion, to Sen. Mark Hatfield).
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have now been promulgated by EPA."8 It sees private litigant
access to audit documents as the only significant problem which
cannot be cured by regulatory reform:
In addition [to changes in regulatory enforcement policy], in order
to ensure that these policy objectives are not circumvented by
citizen enforcement and that environmental audits are not discour-
aged by the risk of other private litigation, a limited environmental
self-evaluation privilege should be recognized and supported by
EPA and states when the aforementioned necessary enforcement
policy changes have been made. As with self-evaluative privileges
that protect the hospital peer review process in some cases, envi-
ronmental audit privileges could be crafted not to keep audit infor-
mation from regulators, but from non-governmental parties who
are not bound to follow the governmental enforcement policy
regime.39
If the problem giving rise to privilege legislation is regulatory
in nature, then the obvious answer is regulatory reform. If the
real concern is citizen suits, toxic tort litigation and other non-
governmental interactions with auditing companies, then those is-
sues should be addressed squarely in a public forum. They should
not be the silent engine that drives a legislative movement which
will have a demonstrably devastating impact on the ability to
prosecute those whom even privilege proponents believe should
be prosecuted.
Because some privilege proponents have prior environmental
enforcement experience, their assertions that privilege laws will
cause no harm are cloaked in a presumption of validity. Respond-
ing to government concerns that privilege laws would lead to
increased litigation and wasted resources, one such privilege
advocate observed:
It is correct that audit results have been used infrequently in actual
prosecutions by governmental enforcers. Thus, unless regulators
38. Virtually all of CMPG's recommendations for improving the effectiveness
of enforcement, vis-a-vis compliance efforts, were enacted by EPA in its policies
which took effect in January, 1996. Compare Jim Moore, A Response to "The
Case Against an Environmental Audit Privilege," NAT'L ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT
J., Dec. 1994-Jan. 1995, at 8 (CMPG recommendations) with EPA policy, supra
note 4 (enacted policies).
39. Moore, supra note 38, at 8 (footnote omitted).
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are planning to use them more in the future (which most regulators
claim not to be their intention), audit privileges cannot lead to
more litigation.'
To a prosecutor who routinely investigates and prosecutes
environmental crimes, the conclusion is a non sequitur. The state-
ment assumes that criminal cases - both the inception and the
evidence that supports them - comes from a regulatory process.
Nothing could be further from the truth.
The speaker clearly does not know that most criminal cases are
initiated by informants, 911 calls about dumping incidents, and
proactive investigations. Those criminal investigations which are
initiated by referrals from regulatory agencies generally involve
continuing patterns of illegal dumping or fraudulent conduct on
the part of the targets.4'
Another former prosecutor is also apparently unfamiliar with
the types of environmental cases which are criminally prosecuted
and how they are investigated: "[i]f... EPA and DOJ rarely rely
on environmental audit materials to prosecute in situations where
any violations found are promptly corrected ... such a privilege
would not impede federal enforcement significantly."'42 If law
enforcement efforts consisted of prosecuting companies for self-
discovered and self-corrected violations, without access to audit
reports, the speaker's conclusion that audit privilege would have
little impact on continued enforcement would be correct. Howev-
er, those cases are not criminally prosecuted.
Such hypothetical cases provide a fruitless frame of reference
for examining the effect of audit privilege laws. To reasonably
assess how such laws will impact the criminal justice system and
40. Id. at 8-9.
41. Comment in text is based on author's experience in Suffolk County
District Attorney's Office, and on exchanges with local prosecutors through pro-
fessional district attorneys associations. For a review of environmental crime
cases typically handled by local prosecutors, see The Local Prosecution of Envi-
ronmental Crimes, A Literature Review, National District Attorneys Association,
American Prosecutors Research Institute, National Environmental Crime Prosecu-
tion Center, Aug. 14, 1992.
42. Joseph G. Block & Gregory S. Braker, Environmental Auditing in the
Current Enforcement Climate, ALI-ABA Course on Criminal Enforcement of
Environmental Laws, Oct. 21, 1994, Washington, D.C., at 20.
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public health and safety, one must look at the criminal cases
which are prosecuted, and how they will be affected.
III. ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME PROSECUTIONS
The nation's district attorneys conduct the overwhelming ma-
jority of environmental crime prosecutions. Their involvement in
environmental crime prosecution has grown at an almost expo-
nential rate over the last decade. During the first six months of
1992, more criminal cases were prosecuted by district attorneys
than the Justice Department prosecuted in the prior ten years. 3
Their corporate defendants are typically small companies, with
fewer than fifty employees.'
At best, EPA can only handle about ten percent of the neces-
sary environmental enforcement in the country.45 Since most
illegal dumping of hazardous waste takes place within a twenty-
five mile radius of the site of generation, 6 and most companies
that commit those crimes are small in size, investigation of
dumping incidents is necessarily a local concern. The local
official's responsiveness to community concerns explains why
district attorneys around the country are devoting ever increasing
portions of their resources to a field which might easily be left to
federal or state officials.47
43. EPA's Criminal Enforcement Program: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations, of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. 111-12 (1993) (statement of Richard T. Nixon, Director,
National District Attorneys Association Environmental Crime Prosecution Cen-
ter).
44. DONALD J. REBOVICH, DANGEROUS GROUND: THE WORLD OF HAZARD-
OUS WASTE CRIME 31 (1992).
45. Statement of Hon. Herbert Tate, Assistant Administrator of EPA, Tran-
scripts and Selected Proceedings from A Colloquium on the Prosecution of Urban
Environmental Crimes and the Use of Multi-Agency Strike Forces, presented by
National District Attorneys Association, American Prosecutors Research Institute,
National Environmental Crime Prosecution Center, in cooperation with the
NDAA Environmental Protection and Metropolitan Prosecutors Committees, July
20, 1992, Amelia Island, Florida, at 11 [hereinafter Colloquium].
46. Id.
47. In Riverside, California, the District Attorney first prosecuted illegal
dumping on a Native American reservation. See, Colloquium, supra note 45, at
13. In Monmouth County, New Jersey, a local prosecutor decided that the quality
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Privilege advocates claim that the benefit of more companies
self-auditing outweighs the harm of prosecutions being precluded
by privilege laws.' The argument reflects a lack of knowledge
of life in the county was so affected by littering that a felony littering law was
necessary. Id. at 6. In Alameda County, California, with the fifth highest homi-
cide rate in the country, an Environmental Crimes Division exists in the District
Attorney's Office because the community sees environmental crime as a public
safety issue. Id. at 13. In Staten Island, New York, illegal out-of-state hazardous
waste haulers who were using a landfill as a dumpsite were prosecuted for brib-
ing landfill officials; when the existing environmental laws were inadequate, the
District Attorney of Staten Island was responsible for writing tougher new laws.
Id. at 2-5.
48. The Oregon prosecutor who participated in drafting the state privilege law
opined: "[i]f we lose evidence in one case, but 25 or 50 companies got audits and
cleaned up problems, I believe we are better overall. Obviously, only time will
tell." Air Docket Document II-F-09, supra note 29. His opinion, like that of
others, was presumably influenced by the fact that there was "virtually no expe-
rience" to draw on in the state. There had only been three or four criminal envi-
ronmental investigations ever conducted under state law (which did not include
felonies) and no more than four or five conducted by federal investigators. Air
Docket Document VIII-13, supra note 27, at 114 (remarks of Craig Johnston at
January 20, 1995 EPA meeting).
Though environmental self-audit privilege legislation has been sold as a
means by which more companies will be induced to audit, and thus lead to more
environmental compliance and less pollution, there is no support for this notion.
The Price Waterhouse study, which was commissioned by two groups that en-
dorsed audit privilege legislation, was conducted to provide EPA with up-to-date
information on auditing practices of United States companies. The study was
potentially skewed to support audit legislation, since most of the respondents
belonged to the very associations which commissioned the study and had already
favorably endorsed such laws. Despite the potential bias in the study, it provided
no evidence at all that privilege legislation would cause companies who do not
already audit to begin doing so. The reasons most commonly cited by companies
who didn't audit were that: (a) they didn't believe the need exists to perform
these audits (52%), (b) their processes and products have insignificant environ-
mental impacts (43%), or (c) it was otherwise not necessary (18%). Though
respondents to the survey were instructed to check all applicable answers to the
question, only 20% of the companies who do not audit cited as a reason a "con-
cern that audit information could somehow be used against the company". Ac-
cordingly, there is no reason - save the blanket assertions of privilege propo-
nents - to believe that the privilege laws will even accomplish what they are
designed to do. See Price Waterhouse study, supra note 1. What would induce
companies to come into compliance with the environmental laws is simpler
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about the crimes being committed. As the cost of environmental
compliance has increased, so has incidence of environmental
crime and fraud in the environmental services industry. Consider
the following scenarios: midnight dumping, "on-site" dumping,
unlawful dealing in hazardous waste, and environmental fraud.
A. Midnight Dumping Cases
"Midnight dumping" typically involves the abandonment of
fifty-five gallon drums of waste dumped on roadsides or in se-
cluded wooded areas.49 In recent years, midnight dumpers have
gotten smarter and the quantities of waste dumped have dramati-
cally increased.
During the last eighteen months in Suffolk County, New
York," four separate incidents have been investigated in which
hazardous substances have been disposed of by hiding drums of
waste in stolen forty-foot trailers. Three of those incidents each
involved more than one hundred fifty-five gallon drums of waste
product. In one instance, the waste was generated more than a
thousand miles away, and was left in a stolen trailer near a public
shopping center within the county.5 In another, the waste was
transported to and disposed of in an adjoining state." In a third,
all of the labels, lot numbers, and identifying features, as well as
regulations, penalty mitigation for self-disclosed and reported violations, and
other programs which provide certainty for companies dealing with regulatory
agencies. See generally transcript of January 20, 1995 EPA meeting, supra note
27, and December 22, 1995 EPA policy, supra note 4.
49. Illegally dumped drums discovered in the author's jurisdiction over the
last thirteen years have been traced to a wide range of generators: among them
are automotive repair companies, print shops, plating operations, chemical manu-
facturers and illegal cocaine laboratories.
50. The District Attorney's office in Suffolk County has prosecuted environ-
mental crimes since the mid-1970s. A full-time assistant district attorney and
detective investigator were assigned to the Environmental Crime Unit in 1984.
Since 1990, the author has been the chief of the Unit, which now has three attor-
neys and five investigators. The Unit also works regularly with criminal investi-
gators from the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation,
EPA, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Defense, and other state
and local police agencies.
51. Suffolk County District Court Docket No. 29237-96.
52. Investigation pending.
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the vehicle identification number on the trailer, were obliterated
with a heavy duty grinding tool to prevent tracing before the two
hundred containers were loaded at a business site in the adjoining
county, and abandoned in an industrial park.53
B. "On-Site" Dumping Cases
Illegal "on-site" discharges of waste are frequently committed
by companies that create and conceal illegal disposal systems at
their places of business. These include, for example, hidden pip-
ing systems leading to unregistered cesspools dug for industrial
waste disposal, waste pits installed underneath manufacturing
facilities, and parallel waste routing systems which divert waste
streams around treatment systems and directly into sewage pipes.
In most cases, the motive for such activity is financial. Illegal on-
site dumpers frequently decide to dump after obtaining estimates
for lawful disposal of waste. At least three companies with prior
criminal convictions in Suffolk County for illegal dumping or
disposal of waste, are presently under investigation or indictment
by the District Attorney's Office. All of those cases involve dis-
charges of hazardous substances, which pose grave danger to the
county's water supply.54
53. Suffolk County Indictment No. 1-1654A-96,1654B-96, and 1654C-96.
54. Suffolk County, the eastern most county on Long Island, sits atop an aqui-
fer which provides all of its drinking water. More than ninety percent of the
county is without a sewer system. Most of its heavy industry is located in areas
with cesspools and storm drains that leach directly into the ground. Its coastline
stretches out to over one thousand miles. These factors are responsible for the
county's aggressive environmental policies, including the active industrial inspec-
tions by its health department, the existence of one of the largest public environ-
mental laboratories, and the requirement that county police sector car drivers
handle illegal dump sites as crime scenes which necessitates that they call out
emergency service officers and environmental crime detectives. See Suffolk
County, N.Y., Standard Operating Procedure #H-05 (August 1989); Suffolk
County, N.Y., Police Department Rules and Procedures, Illegal Dumping of Haz-
ardous Materials 5.35-37. Additionally, the enactment of local laws such as the
nation's first underground storage tank removal program, help to protect the
county's precious resources. See SUFFOLK COUNTY, N.Y., SANrrARY CODE,
art.12, §§ 760-1201 to 760-1220 (adopted Sept. 12 1979).
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C. Unlawful Dealing in Hazardous Waste
Generators looking to save money on hazardous waste disposal
frequently pay unlicensed haulers to take their waste away. Oth-
ers will pay licensed haulers to take some of it "off the books"
and introduce it into an unsuspecting business' waste stream, to
be paid for by that business. Those bad actor generators can only
be caught with the use of traditional undercover investigative
techniques that are used to catch drug dealers or stolen property
rings. These undercover "hazardous waste sting operations" can
only be conducted with the assistance of an informant to make
"introductions" between police and bad actor generators. Usually,
those informants have themselves been arrested for environmental
crimes, and have already engaged in unlawful dealing of hazard-
ous waste with the target companies. Their motivation to assist
undercover police, as in all criminal cases, is to gain favorable
treatment from prosecutors and the courts.5
D. Environmental Fraud Cases
A 1995 study commissioned by the American Society for Test-
ing and Materials revealed that eighty-seven percent of environ-
mental professionals surveyed believed that users of environmen-
tal services are not able to distinguish between legitimate and
sham credentials.5 6 For this reason, efforts are now underway by
national organizations to establish accreditation criteria for use in
evaluating environmental professional certification programs.
55. The need for an informant is two-fold. First, people rarely engage in
criminal conduct with people whom they do not know and trust. Second, the
entrapment laws, as a practical matter, prevent successful prosecution of persons
who are dealing with undercover police unless such persons were already predis-
posed to commit the crime. At least three different prosecutors' offices have
conducted successful hazardous waste dealing stings in New York State (Suffolk
County, Westchester County, and the Attorney General). Attempts to conduct
such an investigation without an informant by a jurisdiction in another state led to
dismal failure, with terrible public outrage, extensive media coverage, and ulti-
mate dismissal of the charges.
56. Emerging Environmental Standards Set New Ground Rules, DATALINK
(Envtl. Data Resources, Inc.), Winter 1996, at 2, 6.
57. Id.
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While the professional environmental industry has come to
recognize that others in the business may be unqualified, the
problem goes far beyond poor job performance by those with
sham credentials. There are bad actors in the environmental ser-
vices industry who use their businesses to steal. Law enforcement
was the first to see, and, where possible, apprehend those bad
actors.
Fraud in the environmental industry takes many forms. Victims
and perpetrators alike are found in every sector: manufacturers,
waste generators, transportation/storage/disposal ("TSD") facili-
ties, government, parties to real estate or business transactions,
lenders, environmental consultants, and the general public. It has
become easy and common to falsify weight tickets or gallonage
measurements in the transport and disposal of waste products.
Despite the fact that such over-billing is routine, generators and
the consultants, in-house managers, and lawyers who guide them,
are unaware that those events occur.
Dishonest environmental laboratories willingly falsify sample
analysis, or close their eyes to the fact that a submitted sample is
actually tap water. "Clean" sample results are frequently the
keystone to multi-million dollar loans, purchase money mortgag-
es, stock acquisitions, or closings on commercial real estate trans-
actions.
Sham consultants with simple desk-top computers and color
printers turn out fraudulent trucking manifests, hazardous waste
manifests, and certificates of destruction or recycling. Generators,
particularly those with deep pockets and active environmental
compliance programs, frequently pay more money to have waste
recycled in order to avoid the potential civil liability associated
with waste disposal. However, where there is collusion, or a
pattern of intentional fraudulent conduct, no degree of diligence
can fully protect an unknowing company whose waste is simply
dumped or buried.58
58. The fraudulent conduct described in the text is all based on investigations,
prosecutions, witness testimony or informant debriefings conducted in Suffolk
County. However, conversations with other federal, state and local law enforce-
ment agencies reveal that the described conduct is becoming prevalent throughout
the country.
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IV. IMPACT OF PRIVILEGE LAWS ON CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT
Privilege proponents find it difficult to fathom how investiga-
tions would be impacted by privilege laws. Prosecutors find it
difficult to fathom how they can intelligently allocate resources to
a case when they do not know where an investigation will take
them, and what legal roadblocks they will encounter when they
get there.
A. The Allocation of Resources: When to Investigate
The costs of conducting environmental investigations are ex-
tremely high. Money is a crucial factor, entering into decisions
such as whether a warrant can be executed or how many samples
to take. Execution of search warrants for evidence of illegal waste
dumping requires large numbers of specially trained and equipped
personnel to satisfy Occupational Safety and Health Administra-
tion ("OSHA") requirements for the handling of hazardous mate-
rials.59 Laboratory costs for analyzing environmental samples are
In 1995, two individuals and three companies in Suffolk County were con-
victed (by trial and plea) of falsifying records to make it appear that illegally
dumped waste from more than a dozen generators was properly recycled. In one
case, a publicly owned hospital paid hundreds of thousands of dollars to remove
and recycle contaminated soil. One of the subcontractors falsified the transporta-
tion and disposal records submitted to the hospital for payment, including truck-
ing manifests, scale tickets and certificates of destruction. Though the hospital
had no way of knowing it, half the soil never made it to the recycling facility.
When another subcontractor became suspicious because it had not been paid
enough, a meeting was held to straighten the matter out. A third subcontractor,
for a paltry fee of thirty thousand dollars, helped protect the original forgers by
creating new and better forged documents to present to the hospital for payment.
Until contacted by criminal investigators, the hospital never new it had been
defrauded. Other victims in this scheme included multinational oil companies,
public utilities, municipalities and major manufacturers. None of them were
aware they had paid top dollar to contractors who had simply buried their waste.
See Suffolk County Indictment No. 1-455D-94, 455E-94, 455H-94.
59. The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA),
included an emergency planning and community right to know provision known
as Title HI. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1994). SARA Title III required OSHA to
enact health and safety standards for workers who handle hazardous substances.
The regulations enacted include, among other things, site study and site control
procedures; necessary personal protective equipment for workers who handle
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exorbitant since most jurisdictions do not have government labo-
ratories certified to perform required tests.
Environmental cases frequently involve the use of witnesses
and physical evidence from other jurisdictions. Consultants, trans-
porters, and TSD facilities that had contact with a target frequent-
ly do business across state lines. Resources must be available to
engage in interstate subpoena litigation, interviews in far away
locations, and potential court hearings in foreign state jurisdic-
tions.
The decision to devote precious resources to an environmental
investigation is complex. Prosecutors must ask themselves ques-
tions such as: What is the nature and extent of the suspected (or
already discovered) harm? Are there investigative means available
to determine whether a crime took place? What are the exact
crimes that would be charged, depending on possible outcomes of
investigative leads? Are all the legal elements of those crimes
provable? Will the evidence be legally admissible in court? What
is the likelihood of conviction? How expensive and time-consum-
ing will the investigation be? How serious are the allegations here
compared to other allegations which might go uninvestigated if
resources are devoted to this case?
B. Effect of Privilege Laws on Tools of the Prosecutor
Privilege laws deal the hardest blow to the prosecutor's ability
to fairly exercise judgement and discretion. Criminal prosecutions
are bound by both constitutional and statutory standards. Though
the rules change through court decisions, statutes clearly set forth
the tools that are available to police and prosecutors in criminal
cases. It is through the faithful and vigorous use of those tools
that a prosecutor is able to make decisions that are in the public
interest. Privilege legislation changes or affects the usefulness or
reliability of every such crucial tool.
hazardous materials; training requirements; medical surveillance, including annual
baseline exams for such workers; requirements for safety backups and rescue
plans. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910 (1995).
1996] ENVTL. SELF-AUDIT PRIVILEGE 657
1. Grand Jury's Broad Constitutional Power to Investigate Will
Be Thwarted
The duty to testify before a grand jury is a basic obligation
owed to the Government by every citizen.' The Fifth Amend-
ment meshes with the grand jury power in that a subpoenaed
witness in a federal grand jury hearing receives "use immunity".
This means that neither the witness' testimony, nor evidence
derived therefrom, can be used in evidence against the witness. A
New York grand jury witness automatically receives "transaction-
al immunity". There, the witness can never be prosecuted for any
of the transactions about which testimony is given, even if the
transactions were not the subject of the grand jury's investiga-
tion." This broad power to compel evidence, together with the
60. See United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950). The power of the
grand jury to investigate criminal activity and compel persons to appear and
testify is exceedingly broad. It is "a grand inquest, a body with powers of investi-
gation and inquisition, the scope of whose inquiries is not to be limited narrowly
by questions of propriety or forecasts of the probable result of the investigation,
or by doubts whether any particular individual will be found properly subject to
an accusation of crime." Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919). The
grand jury's investigative powers to inquire into violations of criminal law and its
"constitutional prerogatives are rooted in long centuries of Anglo-American
history." Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 489-90 (1960). "The grand jury may
compel the production of evidence or the testimony of witnesses as it considers
appropriate, and its operation generally is unrestrained by the technical procedural
and evidenitiary rules governing the conduct of criminal trials .... The grand
jury's investigative power must be broad if its public responsibility is adequately
to be discharged." United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343-44 (1974). The
courts may not suspend or impair the functioning of the law's ancient investigato-
ry body whose action "may be triggered by tips, rumors, evidence proffered by
the prosecutor, or the personal knowledge of the grand jurors." Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 701 (1972).
61. Immunity in New York grand jury proceedings differs from federal prac-
tice. In federal practice, the witness must invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self incrimination before the government may trade transactional immuni-
ty for testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181 (1977).
However, under the New York Criminal Procedure Law, a witness cannot invoke
the privilege against self incrimination in the grand jury and no one confers
immunity upon the witness. Immunity is automatic. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§§ 50.20(1), 190.40(1) (McKinney 1992). This automatic transactional immunity
provision raises difficulties which may occur when a prosecutor inadvertently
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immunity protection for witnesses from whom evidence is com-
pelled, assures that society's interests can be protected by a com-
plete investigation when criminal wrongdoing or government
misconduct or nonfeasance is suspected.
The privilege laws identify whole classes of people, such as
employees, consultants, contractors, transporters, lenders, and
buyers who cannot be compelled to testify before a grand jury to
determine whether a crime has been committed or the public
health and safety is at risk even though those people could not be
prosecuted if they committed crimes. It is unconscionable to
prosecutors that a grand jury should have reduced power to in-
vestigate in cases which pose potentially grave risks to society.
2. Audit Privilege Laws Have Broader Application Than Other
Existing Privileges
Very few existing privileges can be used to withhold evidence
from a grand jury62 or from a government agency investigating
calls as a witness a perpetrator who is not suspected of complicity. Upon giving
an answer responsive to any inquiry that has bearing on an incident, the witness
automatically receives immunity and can never thereafter be prosecuted. See
People v. Williams, 438 N.E.2d 1146 (N.Y. 1982). Indeed, a witness may even
receive transactional immunity for a crime totally unrelated to the one under
investigation by responding to a simple question regarding an innocuous fact -
i.e., his occupation. See People v. McFarlan, 366 N.E.2d 1357 (N.Y. 1977).
62. The confidentiality of subpoenaed documents is protected by grand jury
secrecy requirements. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6 (e); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW art.
190 (McKinney 1992). While secrecy concerns are recognized, in limited circum-
stances, as justification for a privilege where confidentiality would provide an
identifiable social benefit (see, e.g., Bredice v. Doctors Hospital, Inc., 50 F.R.D.
249 (D.D.C. 1970), affd, 479 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1973)), they do not constitute
reasons to withhold information from a criminal investigation. "The divulgence of
potentially incriminating evidence against [a subject] is naturally unwel-
come .... Yet such divulgence ... is a necessary part of the process of law
enforcement... " Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 329 (1973). According-
ly, privileges which apply in private actions do not apply where government
seeks the documents. See Federal Trade Commission v. TRW, Inc., 628 F.2d 207
(D.C. Cir. 1980); Emerson Electric Co. v. Schlesinger, 609 F.2d 898 (8th Cir.
1979); United States v. Noall, 587 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441
U.S. 923 (1979); Reynolds Metals Co. v. Rumsfeld, 564 F.2d 663 (4th Cir.
1977), cert. denied sub nom. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Brown, 435 U.S. 995
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public welfare issues. Where existing privileges can be asserted to
withhold evidence from a grand jury, they only protect communi-
cations. Environmental audit privilege laws, however, shield
documents and underlying facts and knowledge of targets from
grand jury scrutiny. Unlike existing privileges, which a claimant
must prove applies to preclude admission of evidence, audit privi-
lege laws presume a privilege exists. Prosecutors must disprove
the existence of a privilege before conducting an investigation.
3. Audit Privilege Laws Impose Suppression of Evidence, and
the "Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" Doctrine in Cases Where
There Has Been No Police Misconduct and No Unlawful Seizure
of Evidence
Environmental audit privileges prohibit the admission of any
evidence which was developed from audit documents that are
later ruled privileged, whether or not the prosecutor knew that a
witness' knowledge derived from such a report. This contradicts
existing law, under which evidence is admissible even if it was
developed from a privileged communication; only the privileged
communication itself is inadmissible.63
(1978). Privilege laws which would deny access to audit documents would be
contrary to long established New York law as well. See, e.g., People v. Tissois,
526 N.E.2d 1086 (N.Y. 1988) (social worker privilege); Knight-Ridder v.
Greenberg, 511 N.E.2d 1116 (N.Y. 1987) (shield law); In re Grand Jury Subpoe-
nas [X & Y], 505 N.E.2d 925 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 928 (1987) (physi-
cian-patient privilege); People v. Wilkins, 480 N.E.2d 373 (N.Y. 1985) (psychol-
ogist-patient privilege); Stem v. Morgenthau, 465 N.E.2d 349 (N.Y. 1984) (confi-
dential records of state Commission on Judicial Conduct); Virag v. Hynes, 430
N.E.2d 1249 (N.Y. 1981).
63. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine is a long-standing extension of
the exclusionary rule, embodying federal courts' early efforts to deter police
misconduct. When an officer would procure evidence in a manner that violated
the defendant's Fourth or Fifth Amendment rights, such evidence would be sup-
pressed under the exclusionary rule. Furthermore, any evidence procured directly
as a result of the misconduct - the "fruit" of the officer's illegal activity -
would similarly be suppressed. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471
(1963).
The primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is not to remedy the injury to
the privacy of the defendant. Rather, the rule is primarily intended to deter future
unlawful police conduct which usurps the guarantees of the Fourth and Fifth
19961 659
660 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VII
4. Privilege Laws Create A Fifth Amendment Privilege For
Corporations
Under the Constitution, only natural persons are guaranteed a
right against self-incrimination. Corporations, as fictional entities,
Amendments. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347. "The rule is calculated to prevent, not
to repair. Its purpose is to deter - to compel respect for the constitutional guar-
anty in the only effectively available way - by removing the incentive to disre-
gard it." Id. (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)). Accord,
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968); Tehan v. United States, 382 U.S. 406, 416
(1966).
Consequently, federal courts have repeatedly refused to apply this doctrine
where the privilege asserted is not rooted in constitutional right. In United States
v. Lefkowitz, 618 F.2d 1313 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980), the
defendant, Lefkowitz, under investigation for various tax fraud offenses, moved
boxes of corporate records to his secretary's apartment so that cosmetically al-
tered duplicates could be provided to the IRS in response to a summons. The
defendant's wife assisted him in moving the boxes and knew all about his alter-
ation of the originals. Four months later, she anonymously telephoned the IRS
agents investigating her husband and informed them of the falsified books, the
removal of the originals, and the fact that some of the original records were
moved back into the office after the return on the IRS summons. Pursuant to this
information, the IRS issued search warrants for the Lefkowitz corporate offices
and Lefkowitz's residence. The affidavit did not reveal that the secret informant
was Lefkowitz's wife.
Much of the evidence used to convict Lefkowitz was obtained through the
execution of these warrants. Lefkowitz sought to suppress this evidence because
it was the "fruit" of information protected under the confidential marital commu-
nications privilege. The court found the evidence admissible, but stated that be-
cause the marital communications privilege is not grounded in constitutional
rights, a secondary source of information obtained through this communication
would not likely be "tainted." Id. at 1318-19.
Ten years later, the Ninth Circuit again considered a "fruit" suppression
request based upon the marital communications privilege in United States v.
Marashi, 913 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1990). The court held the spousal testimony
admissible despite the privilege, and therefore did not need to address the "fruit"
suppression request. However, the court relied on the Leflcowitz dicta in stating:
[W]e need not resolve Marashi's claim that all evidence derived [from
the marital communications testimony] should be excluded as fruits of
the poisonous tree. Suffice it to say that no court has ever applied this
theory to any evidentiary privilege and that we have indicated we
would not be the first to do so. Id. at 731 n.ll.
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are required to produce all records subpoenaed by a grand jury.
Only the individuals who are subpoenaed to testify receive immu-
nity. Under the environmental privilege laws however, corpora-
tions receive greater protection from criminal investigations, and
prosecutors have weaker tools to conduct such prosecutions,
though the crimes under investigation pose a threat to the envi-
ronment and public safety.64
5. Privilege Laws Conflict With Constitutionally and Statutorily
Derived Rules Regarding Admissibility of Evidence
Because excess litigation unreasonably interferes with the effec-
tive and expeditious discharge of a grand jury's duties,
exclusionary rules cannot be invoked by grand jury witnesses.65
Audit privilege laws compel hearings on the admissibility of audit
documents which ultimately preclude such documents, or evi-
dence derived from them, from consideration by a grand jury. In
this way, the provisions of those laws as they apply to grand jury
subpoenas, squarely contradict the unequivocal holdings of the
64. It has long been established in the federal common law that corporations
and other "collective entities" are entitled to no protection under the privilege
against self-incrimination. See United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944);
Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43
(1906). Furthermore, the custodian of corporate "books and papers" has no
privilege to refuse their production although their contents tend to incriminate
him or her. Wilson, 221 U.S. at 382. See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99,
110 (1988).
65. The remedy of suppression is only available to a party if and when an
indictment is returned and the allegedly unlawfully seized evidence is intended to
be used against him, or when the seizure has been previously adjudicated unlaw-
ful. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338; Silverthome Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S.
385 (1920). In deciding whether to apply the exclusionary rule to the grand jury,
the Courts have consistently balanced the potential benefits of applying the rule
to the grand jury against the detrimental impact on the functions of that body.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338. Reaffirming its oft stated position that a grand jury
investigation should not be saddled with mini-trials on possibly tangential issues,
the Supreme Court refused to allow a grand jury witness to invoke the
exclusionary rule: "In the context of a grand jury proceeding, we believe that the
damage to that institution from the unprecedented extension of the exclusionary
rule urged by respondent outweighs the benefit of any possible incremental
deterrent effect." Id. at 354.
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Supreme Court and state appellate courts regarding the conduct of
grand jury investigations.'
Federal and state criminal procedure laws set forth timetables
for raising both constitutional issues and evidentiary questions,
namely, after accusatory instruments have been filed.67 Litigating
such issues before charges are filed is a waste of government and
judicial resources. Privilege laws interfere with the orderly con-
duct of criminal cases by vesting in a variety of courts the obliga-
tion to make premature evidentiary rulings on matters which will
be outside their jurisdiction if charges are even filed. No one can
guess what the legal impact of such unorthodox procedures will
be when a defendant appeals a conviction, claiming error regard-
ing an evidentiary ruling made by a court without jurisdiction
over the criminal case.
6. Audit Privilege Laws Will Have An Unpredictable Impact on
the Interstate Subpoena Power of Prosecutors
The Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from
Without the State in Criminal Proceedings has been enacted by
all fifty states.6" The act sets forth clear cut procedures for pros-
ecutors to establish that out-of-state witnesses (and documents)
are material and necessary to a criminal trial or grand jury inves-
tigation. The prosecutor makes such a showing in the court with
jurisdiction over the case ("requesting court"), which certifies the
need for the witness to the court having jurisdiction over the wit-
ness whose evidence is required ("sending court"). The sending
court gives notice to the witness, who may only challenge the in-
terstate subpoena on the grounds that attendance would cause
undue hardship.69 Claims of privilege, as a basis for challenging
66. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
67. Rule 12 (b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and article 710 of
the New York State Criminal Procedure Law both provide that suppression
motions shall be made after arraignment on the indictment. See FED. R. CRIM. P.
12(b); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW art. 710 (McKinney 1995).
68. 11 U.L.A. 5 (1936). In New York, the act is codified at N.Y. CRM.
PROC. LAW § 640.10 (McKinney 1995).
. 69. The constitutionality of the statute has been upheld on the ground that a
state's power to deliver a material witness within its borders to a sister state is an
inherent implication of our federalism. New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1 (1959).
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a subpoena, have been relegated to the court in which the witness
will testify because evidentiary rulings are deemed within the
purview of the court which has jurisdiction over the proceed-
ing.70
It is impossible to predict exactly how the idiosyncratic privi-
lege procedures will interplay with what has always been a
straightforward, dependable tool for obtaining evidence from
other jurisdictions. The only sure impact will be confusion, in-
creased layers of litigation and delay. In short, all the rules are
changed by privilege laws, but law enforcement agencies will
never get a copy of the rule book. The lack of predictability in
how evidence can be obtained, and the inability to assure that a
costly, labor-intensive prosecution will be viable, is certain to
drive prosecutors out of the environmental field.
C. Use of Audit Reports Against Companies Which Audit
The issue for prosecutors is not whether an audit report should
be admissible to criminally prosecute someone for inadvertent
violations committed prior to, and discovered during, the course
of an audit. That situation has never arisen, and is not likely to
arise in the future. On the other hand, if a company is found to
be illegally dumping waste today, information in a previously
conducted audit report will be extremely relevant. For that matter,
all contacts by the company with environmental consultants,
disposal facilities, transporters, and regulators will be relevant.
Knowledge obtained through an audit conducted two years ago
may well be the motive for today's illegal dumping.
To explain the problem with privilege statutes, as they apply to
the use of audit reports in evidence against the company that
conducted the audit, consider the following hypothetical example:
Assume that someone at a suspect company is, in fact, engaging
in the illegal dumping of a highly toxic substance. Further assume
For a discussion of the statute as it applies to production of documents, see Jay
M. Zitter, Annotation, Availability Under Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance
of Witnesses from Without a State in Criminal Proceedings of Subpoena Duces
Tecum, 7 A.L.R. 4th 836 (1994).
70. Codey ex rel. New Jersey v. Capital Cities, American Broadcasting Corp,
Inc., 626 N.E.2d 636 (N.Y. 1993).
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that the company, several years ago, conducted a good faith,
legitimate audit. The audit, which disclosed that drums of haz-
ardous waste were improperly handled and stored, set forth prop-
er handling and storage methods for the particular raw product
and waste materials at the site. It also provided lawful treatment
and disposal options for the waste product. The company then
corrects the problem, creating appropriate containment areas. It
lawfully disposes of its waste for the next two years. When dis-
posal prices go up (or the company faces other financial prob-
lems) the owners decide to hire an unlicensed hauler to get rid of
the drums. They are dumped deep in a wooded area near a
stream; a child is injured.
When the drums are traced back to the site of generation, a
search warrant is executed or subpoena issued for any and all
documents, including audit documents, relating to waste genera-
tion, storage, and disposal. It is uncontrovertible that the audit
documents would be useful to prove that the owners knew what
the illegally dumped waste product was, its characteristics, and
the lawful method of disposal. The documents would also lead in-
vestigators to others who were familiar with those facts and could
be compelled to testify regarding the owners' knowledge and
decision to change their method of disposal. Given the facts de-
scribed, it would be disingenuous to argue that the owners should
not be prosecuted or the documents used against them.
Under most environmental audit privilege laws, the audit docu-
ments in this hypothetical could not be used: The audit was not
conducted for a fraudulent purpose; it was done in good faith and
the problems were immediately corrected.7' It does not disclose
evidence of the crimes which are the subject of the prosecution,
and the information is available through other means.72 That
those means might require compelling every single employee to
testify about company procedures, granting them immunity in the
process, is not a factor considered by the privilege statutes.73
While there are numerous fact scenarios which would demon-
strate why legitimate audit reports should be available to criminal
71. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
72. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
73. See generally supra notes 60-61.
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investigators in connection with a review of the audited
company's activities, the short of it is this: audit reports are really
only useful, and would only be used, in the investigation and
prosecution of crimes which are committed subsequent to the
audit. The specific evidentiary value is to show the knowledge,
motive, and intent of the bad actor.
D. The Presumption of Privilege: Roadblocks to Investigations
The most significant obstruction caused by privilege laws de-
rives from the procedures and presumptions that are supposed to
make them work. In many statutes and bills, audit reports and
supporting documents must be labeled as such with an indication
that they are privileged.74 Some statutes do not require labeling,
and in some it is optional.75
Documents which are labeled are presumptively privileged.
Prosecutors who obtain those documents must seal them, without
ever reading them.76 Then, an in camera hearing is held to de-
termine whether those particular documents are covered by the
privilege.77 If they are determined to be privileged, neither the
documents, nor information learned from them, nor information
learned from people who saw them, nor testimony from persons
who participated in the audits, nor information developed from
any of those sources can be used against the company in a crimi-
nal proceeding. 78 This is the case even if the prosecutor did not
know that an informant's source of information was an audit
report.79
If the problem were to be faced only with regard to legitimate
74. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1-302(4).
75. In Texas, for example, labeling is optional, even though government offi-
cials may be criminally liable for disseminating privileged audit materials. TEX.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc § (6)(d).
76. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 8-1-309(a)(1)(3), (b)(1); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 224.01-040(5)(a); KAN. STAT. ANN § 60-3335(a), (b).
77. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 8-1-309(b)(1), (c)(1); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 224.01-040(5)(b), (c); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3335(b), (c).
78. See, e.g., TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc §5; ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 8-1-309(B).
79. Though not explicit in the statutes, it is the author's opinion that a reading
of the statutes affords no other logical conclusion.
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audits, the consequences of the statutes would not be so broad.
Yet, the presumptions apply to any labeled document.
While it may be fair to assume for argument that professional
auditors and Fortune 500 companies would not apply the label to
items that do not squarely fit the definition of an audit document,
it would be foolhardy to assume that no one will do so. With the
proliferation of self-proclaimed environmental "experts" and the
rampant increase of fraud in the industry, we must assume that
virtually all documents generated in the environmental arena,
including sampling analysis, estimates for disposal of waste,
waste management and treatment proposals, site assessments,
underground tank removal plans, audit documents prepared in
support of loan applications or real estate transactions, and sales
pitches for new equipment will bear the "privileged" label.
In reviewing - informally - twelve years of environmental
crime prosecutions in Suffolk County, no cases were discovered
in which an audit document which could legitimately be deter-
mined to be privileged under the various privilege statutes was
used in evidence against a company to prosecute it for crimes
which occurred prior to an audit. On the other hand, there have
been occasions in which documents which might qualify as privi-
leged under the statutes have been used to prove financial motive
for illegal dumping which occurred after an audit-type activity at
the company. 0 Similarly, legitimate audit documents which
would clearly qualify as privileged under the statutes are routine-
ly used in investigations and prosecutions of persons who defraud
80. As a general rule, the prosecution must prove that a defendant charged
with illegally dumping hazardous or regulated substances knew that those sub-
stances were "bad." Knowledge is often proved with documents. Those docu-
ments may include material safety data sheets (MSDS), chemical labels, estimates
for disposal, payments for prior lawful disposal, contact with regulatory agencies
regarding the substances, manifests, reports or waste management proposals from
environmental consultants, copies of regulations, or other paperwork in the
defendant's possession which explain proper handling and disposal of waste. In
some cases prosecuted, the documents have been reports which evaluate systems
being utilized by the company, and provide treatment or disposal alternatives and
estimates. It is possible that those documents would fit the statutory definition of
audit reports. Those reports always pre-date the dumping crimes under investiga-
tion, and are used to prove knowledge and financial motive for the current illegal
activities.
ENVTL. SELF-AUDIT PRIVILEGE
the companies which were audited or illegally dispose of the
audited company's waste."'
Virtually every prosecution and investigation of environmental
crime has utilized documents which, in retrospect, would proba-
bly not be determined to be privileged were a hearing held in
accordance with the various statutes.8 2 However, all of those
documents, which were necessary to prove knowledge and intent
on the part of defendants engaged in illegal dumping or larcenous
conduct, would in all likelihood be labeled "privileged" today if a
statute were in place in this jurisdiction. 3 That simple act of
labeling, and the ramifications of the presumption of privilege,
are the crux of the problem.
Because privilege laws preclude even the examination of a
labeled document, and provide that evidence derived from a privi-
leged document cannot be used in an investigation or in evidence
at trial, a prosecutor cannot make a knowing and educated guess
about whether it would be admissible in evidence. Nor can a
prosecutor determine whether talking to a whistleblower, who has
knowledge of grievous wrongdoing and evidence to prove it, will
lead to suppression of all evidence and dismissal of a criminal
case.
In conducting an investigation relating to hazardous chemicals,
81. Legitimate audits conducted by a company seeking to come into compli-
ance must be shared, in whole or in part, with companies hired to remove and/or
recycle waste or provide other compliance services. When the fraudulent service
provider charges the audited company for services it did not provide, or illegally
dumps waste which the audited company paid it to properly recycle, the audit re-
port is necessary to prove knowledge and criminal intent on the part of the
fraudulent service provider.
82. Simple waste disposal estimates and materials describing waste treatment
methods would probably be determined to not be privileged if those documents
were not created as part of an audit, though they would be privileged if contained
within an audit report.
83. Newsletters and advisories abound in the environmental industry. Law
firms, professional associations, engineers, publishing companies, and environ-
mental "consultants" routinely mail notices of legal developments, regulatory
changes, and new programs to clients and potential clients. Passage of an audit
privilege law, and a brief summary of its provisions, would no doubt lead to
labeling of routine environmental documents as "privileged," whether from igno-
rance, a desire to impress clients, or just to be "safe."
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interviews focus on people who either handle the product or
handle the paperwork associated with it. Those people will invari-
ably be the ones most likely to have participated in an audit, or
been made privy to audit related materials. Accordingly, any
witness interviews or testimony stands a marked risk of being
"tainted" under the privilege laws.
The witnesses with the most knowledge of willful, dangerous
activity are precluded from coming forward, in contravention of
federal and state "whistleblower" laws and statutory rewards for
reporting illegal dumping. 4 In Colorado, the privilege law
makes a person who discloses information from audit material
personally liable for any financial loss suffered by the compa-
ny." That liability apparently attaches whether or not the compa-
ny was engaged in illegal activity. The same law makes it a
crime for a law enforcement official to disclose the contents of an
audit report which is determined to be privileged.86
While significant penalties are imposed for revealing audit
information, whether or not it is ultimately determined to be
privileged, statutory penalties are rarely, if ever, provided for
individuals who mislabel documents as privileged and bring the
84. A broad range of federal and state laws have been enacted to protect
employees from unsafe working conditions. "Whistleblower" laws encourage
employees to report environmental, health and safety violations in the workplace
to government authorities. Some give workers the right to sue employers who
violate regulatory consent orders; others require employers to notify workers
when health violations exist. Privilege laws that prohibit reporting which is pro-
tected by the "whistleblower" laws undermine the dramatic progress made in the
last decade toward worker safety. See 30 U.S.C. § 813 (1994) (coal mines); 42
U.S.C. §§ 7621, 7622 (1994) (air pollution); 42 U.S.C. §§ 6971, 6972 (1994)
(solid waste); 33 U.S.C. §§ 1365, 1367 (1994) (water pollution). In New York,
see N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 215 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1996), 740 (McKinney
1988); N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAW § 75-b (McKinney Supp. 1996). In New York
State, the Environmental Conservation Law provides for monetary rewards of up
to twenty-five thousand dollars for reporting environmental crimes. See N.Y.
ENvTL. CONSERV. LAW § 71-2726 (McKinney Supp. 1996).
85. Any party who divulges all or any part of an environmental audit report in
violatation of the Colorado statute "is liable for any damages caused by the
divulgence or dissemination of the information that are incurred by the person or
entity for which the environmental audit report was prepared. COLO. REv. STAT.
§ 13-25-126.5(5)(b)(I).
86. COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-25-126.5(5)(b)(II).
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statutory prohibitions into play. One can only expect that most
businesses who learn of privilege laws, and most providers of
environmental services, will play it safe and label everything as
privileged. After all, there is no harm to a company if a court
later determines the labeled documents do not qualify for protec-
tion.
Further, there is nothing to prevent truly bad actors from inten-
tionally labeling certain documents "privileged" as trip-wires to
warn them that law enforcement is getting close to them in an
investigation. Some of the statutes require that a company be
notified that a labeled document is in the possession of the prose-
cutor, who is prohibited from looking at it before making the
notification. Other statutes simply preclude use of such docu-
ments or derivative evidence unless they are obtained by means
of a search warrant or subpoena, which give the company actual
knowledge of their possession.8
The privilege laws, and the presumption of privilege, will also
pose dramatic threats to the health and safety of both criminal
investigators and the communities in which offending companies
are located. Before a search warrant is executed to gather samples
and other physical evidence of illegal on-site dumping at a facili-
ty, investigators must consider what protective equipment is nec-
essary for personnel, what substances are likely to be encoun-
tered, and whether the surrounding community will be impacted.
If there is an allegation of hidden discharge pipes or waste pools,
plans must be made to locate, uncover, sample, and safeguard the
site. Frequently, heavy equipment is needed to accomplish these
goals.
The more dangerous the chemicals, and the more wantonly
they are stored or used at a facility, the greater the risk to the
personnel going into the facility. Once inside, they cannot leave
until they have accomplished their goals.
87. According to the Texas statute: "A person claiming the privilege is subject
to sanctions... if the court finds that the person intentionally or knowingly
claimed the privilege for unprotected information .... " TEx. REv. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 4447cc § (7)(d).
88. See, e.g., TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc § (9)(h); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 19-7-106(4).
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To help the investigators in their search, and to provide evi-
dence of knowledge and intent for the prosecution, search war-
rants routinely call for seizure of documents which relate to the
manufacturing processes, changes to the physical plant, treatment,
storage and disposal of waste, material safety data sheets, and
contact with regulatory agencies or environmental service provid-
ers. Such documents may warn searchers that unexpected chem-
icals posing unforeseen dangers are located on the site, causing
them to upgrade personal protective equipment or safety proce-
dures in searching the facility. They may help to identify hidden
piping systems, illegal dumping pools, or "hot spots" within the
facility.
With a privilege law in place, some or all of those documents
will no doubt bear "privilege" labels. Whether or not they are
audit materials, and whether or not prosecutors might prevail in a
later hearing and be able to use them at trial, the police executing
the search warrant cannot even look at them. To do so risks total
preclusion of evidence in the case, even though the court issuing
the search warrant has determined that there is probable cause to
believe such documents will tend to prove that the facility man-
agers or owners committed the crimes under investigation.
By precluding access to documents which will help find evi-
dence of hidden disposal sites when there is probable cause to
believe they exist, and lawful authority to search for them, the
presumptions in the privilege laws will shield the most serious
offenders. By precluding access to information about potentially
life threatening conditions when a search is being executed to
prove criminal conduct by bad actors, the privilege laws will
place at risk the very investigators who are willing to take on the
hazardous duty assignment of trying to stop intentional dumping.
Additionally, by precluding access to documents which might
help search personnel to assess the extent of a problem at a site
where hazardous waste is being dumped, privilege laws place at
risk the natural resources and the communities our environmental
laws were designed to protect.
The lack of criminal investigative experience on the part of bill
drafters is most glaringly apparent by what the laws do not ad-
dress. Most of the statutes set forth procedures for determining
the applicability of the privilege when a document is obtained by
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search warrant or subpoena.8 9 Some include a provision for a
letter of request, or formal discovery through criminal procedure
statutes." Virtually all the statutes provide for preclusion from
evidence of any audit document - or evidence developed from it
or someone who saw it - that was obtained in any other man-
ner.
91
The most common way of obtaining information about illegal
activity is through informants. Cases have been initiated in Suf-
folk County by both expected and unexpected types of people: a
sales manager who saw illegal activity while paying a call on a
customer; employees who are being paid off the books, but think
improper waste handling is wrong; a former state prison convict
who was outraged that he had to bury drums of hazardous sub-
stances; an admitted armed robber who turned in his "drug rip
92
partner for dumping waste oil into a storm drain; chemists who
quit their jobs at licensed laboratories due to lax or fraudulent
testing of environmental samples; or licensed industrial waste
haulers who were offered bribes to illegally take hazardous
waste.93
When informants come forward, they are usually anxious to
prove their reliability. If they have proof, they bring it. With
privilege laws in place however, it will never be safe to look at
that proof.
Criminal investigations in the environmental field, though ex-
pensive, labor intensive, and complicated, are handled exactly the
same as any other criminal investigation. The rules of play for
89. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1-309(a)(2); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
3335(a); OR. REV. STAT. § 468.963(4)(a).
90. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1-309(a)(2)(C); COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-
25-126.5(3)(c); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 415, para. 5/52.2(d)(4); WYo. STAT. § 35-
11-1105(c)(v).
91. See, e.g., TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc § (9)(h); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 19-7-106(4).
92. A "drug rip" is a robbery of illegal drugs from dealers. They are frequent-
ly violent, and rarely reported to the police.
93. The author's knowledge of these facts is derived from her first-hand
experience as Assistant District Attorney and chief of the Environmental Crime
Unit of the Suffolk County District Attorney's Office. In order to protect the
identities of informants, specific case numbers are not provided.
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criminal cases are far more stringent than those for civil litigation
and private party actions. While they are rigorous, the constitu-
tional and statutory protection for defendants and restrictions on
law enforcement conduct are at least born of the criminal justice
system in which they apply. Those rules are the only ones that
police and prosecutors should have to worry about.
By injecting artificially created concepts and procedures into
the criminal arena, privilege laws shackle those who try to detect,
punish, and deter the most serious environmental crimes. That is
clearly not the intent of bill drafters and bill proponents.94
E. Privilege Shields for Environmental Fraud
While it is further not the intent of bill drafters and bill propo-
nents to shield from prosecution the sham environmental experts
who are driving up the price of compliance by stealing from
legitimate businesses,95 privilege laws will do just that.
The one place we can clearly expect to see a proliferation of
"privilege" labels is in the offices of those sham environmental
experts. Months of speculation and endless brainstorming among
members of the author's staff have failed to spark a plan which
could enable the investigation and prosecution of a fraudulent
environmental consultant with privilege laws in place.
In any kind of fraud case which involves routine forgery or
falsification of records, the key to the investigation is the records
themselves. When an informant comes forward with insider infor-
mation on a scheme to defraud, the whole first phase of the in-
vestigation is geared at corroborating the informant and develop-
ing probable cause for a search warrant.96 The search warrant is
utilized to seize all potentially forged documents, blank forms,
financial records, correspondence, forgery devices (such as com-
puters and printers), and other records which will help prove the
fraudulent conduct.
The next phase of the investigation, which may take months,
involves among other things the comparison of the documents to
94. See supra part II.
95. See supra part II.
96. Subpoenas are generally useless since records that are surrendered, if they
are surrendered, are invariably altered or incomplete.
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each other, interviews with purported signers of the documents,
acquisition of evidence from third parties, and analysis of finan-
cial records. The ultimate goal is to determine which documents
are false, who falsified them, and who was defrauded.
If the records bear privilege labels, and they no doubt will if
the target company is in the environmental field, they will have
to be sealed without having been reviewed. Computers used to
forge documents cannot be accessed, for they would have in them
information relating to presumptively privileged documents. It
will be impossible to identify, let alone notify the companies
whose facilities were the subject of the audit documents within
the procedural framework of the statutes." No investigation can
be done. None of the exceptions set forth in the various privilege
laws would apply so as to allow use of the documents in evi-
dence (especially those which might not have been forged) with-
out the consent of the companies involved.
Even if the "fraud" exception could be argued, prosecutors
could not prove the fraudulent intent of the target without access
to the documents which cannot be used until the fraudulent intent
is established. In short, the ultimate trial issue - the fraud -
would have to be litigated before the documents would be avail-
able to conduct the investigation. Knowing that an investigation is
doomed to failure would preclude even the most aggressive pros-
ecutor from wasting resources in the attempt.
In many cases of environmental fraud, there are also ordinary
environmental crimes being committed. If a serious environmen-
tal problem exists, it is not as easy to walk away from the inves-
tigation. The scenario which will be used to illustrate the impact
of the privilege laws is quite simple, and according to informants,
quite common: Assume an employee comes forward with an alle-
gation that there is a serious waste dumping problem at his facto-
ry. He also informs the investigator that the boss had recently
obtained a huge loan based on false financial and environmental
audit reports. He is familiar with the hazardous chemicals used at
the factory, and was privy to or at least got a quick look at the
environmental audit report in question.
97. The statutes all presume that audit documents would be obtained by
prosecutors from the audited company itself.
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The potential crimes being committed fall into two general
categories. The first is environmental crime, for the illegal dispos-
al or release into the environment of the waste. The second is
fraud, for forgery, falsification of business records, and grand
larceny. The usual investigative approaches in the two typ," -f
cases have to be carefully utilized and J'1 1 - "
ardize the other.
The first items the .ator needs to see are the documents
submitted to the lender in order to obtain the loan. Those docu-
ments - applications, financial reports, SEC filings, credit re-
cords, sales data, and the environmental audit report - are the
keystone of the investigation. In fact, they will determine whether
there will even be an investigation. In reviewing them, the prose-
cution will look for the following:
How accurate is the informant's information? How much
knowledge does he have? Can additional information he pro-
vides be expected to be reliable?
How relevant are the alleged falsities in the documents? Are
the purportedly false statements significant enough that the
lender would care? Would truthful statements have affected the
loan risk assessment, and would the loan proceeds still have
been paid?
Assuming the statements are false, are they provably false? Or
are they just vague representations and careful omissions?
What documentation might exist to prove they are false if a
search warrant was executed in the facility's office?
With regard to the dumping allegation: are the representations
in the environmental audit report specific as to raw products
used and waste handling? If they are false, are they provably
false? Would a search warrant provide evidence that would
tend to show the truth or falsity of the representations in the
report?
How serious is the alleged dumping? If you take the waste de-
scribed in the report and dump it in the manner described by
the informant, how bad would it be?
From the documents given to the bank, is it evident who in the
company actually participated in and/or saw the audit report?
According to the informant, are any of those who are responsi-
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ble for the dumping the same people who were privy to the
report? Did any of those same people participate in the loan
application process?
If the informant's allegations are true, is there an investigative
means to catch illegal dumping in the act, or observe the boss
giving instructions? Is there any way to get the boss on a re-
,mg talking about the falsehoods in the reports, or the ille-
gal dumping, or the obtaining of the loan?
The basic elements of the environmental crimes and the fraud
crimes are similar. For the environmental crimes, the prosecution
must prove that the dumping occurred, that the defendant was
responsible (either personally or by directing that it be done), and
that the defendant (generally) knew what was being dumped.
For the fraud crimes, the prosecution must prove that the de-
fendant made representations to the lender about how waste is
handled, that those representations were false, that the defendant
knew they were false, and that the lender paid money to the
defendant based on a belief that the representations were true.
Assuming the informant's story is true, a thorough investigation
is likely to elicit clear proof that illegal dumping has occurred.
Surveillance techniques, covert recording of conversations, review
of regulatory inspection files, and sampling under the authority of
a search warrant will assure this part of the criminal case. Proof
of knowledge and intent will be the key, and the documents that
were submitted to the lender will reveal whether an investigation
should be commenced.
The evaluative process that is necessary before a decision can
be made to dedicate investigative resources all turns on the very
document which, under privilege laws, the prosecutor cannot see.
Under most privilege statutes, privilege would not be waived by
the company that provides the audit report to a lender, or poten-
tial partner or buyer. The lender in this scenario cannot give it to
the prosecution even if it wants to, and even if the prosecutor
reveals a suspicion that a fraud was committed. If the environ-
mental audit report is obtained in a manner other than provided in
the privilege laws, all information in it and evidence derived from
it is subject to preclusion from evidence. Even if the prosecutor
refuses to look at the report, there is no way to determine if the
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informant's information was derived from the report.
In short, the only way to lawfully see the documents that were
used to commit the fraud - absent a search warrant - is to
subpoena them from the company, wait the appropriate period of
time for a hearing, and try to prove a fraud that cannot be proved
until a criminal investigation is conducted. Such an investigation,
of course, is impossible without access to the documents in the
first place. It goes without saying that issuing a subpoena would
also give notice of the investigation to the target and preclude
any undercover investigative efforts.
The only other option, a search warrant, could not be obtained
without an investigation to develop probable cause to believe that
crimes were committed at the facility and that the documents
sought constitute evidence of the crime. That too, is another
impossibility without access to the very documents which are
sought.
Even if probable cause could be established based on the
informant's sworn statements to obtain a warrant to search for
evidence of the illegal dumping, no prosecutor would devote the
necessary resources without first being able to judge whether the
informant's information was both reliable and "untainted" by ex-
posure to a potentially privileged document. With privilege laws
in place, the prosecutor could never make that necessary judge-
ment.
In short, an investigation would never take place.
CONCLUSION
The devastating implications of audit privilege legislation has
only begun to sink in as criminal investigations have progressed
with the specter of such laws lurking in the background. With
each increasingly worse dumping incident, and with each discus-
sion of the roadblocks that will confront us, it becomes more
apparent to prosecutors that the extent of harm caused by the
privilege movement will not be known for years to come.
Even if privilege laws would serve the stated purpose of caus-
ing more companies to conduct environmental self-audits, which
is not conceded, their grave impact on law enforcement, on the
businesses they serve to protect, and on public health, safety and
the environment, makes further enactment of such laws uncon-
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scionable.
The fact that such consequences were clearly unintended makes
the need for repeal or reform of such laws all the more compel-
ling.

